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ABSTRACT238 
This article addresses the issues which stem from the State aid investigations 
opened by the European Commission ("EC") against Luxembourg, Ireland and 
the Netherlands, concerning aid granted in the form of tax base reduction to 
certain undertakings, namely Apple Inc., Amazon, Starbucks and Fiat Finance and 
Trade ("FFT"). Furthermore, this article analysis the EC's main line of argument 
in the aforementioned State aid investigations that is, acceptance by the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg, of the proposed calculation of the taxable 
base of these MN Es which do not reflect normal market conditions, may result in 
State aid, in that it will offer a more favourable treatment to the MNE compared 
to the treatment other undertakings would normally receive under the Member 
States' 'normal' tax system. In arriving at what would constitute normal market 
conditions, the EC uses two benchmarks namely, the internationally accepted 
standard, the Arm's Length Principle ("ALP") and the Prudent Independent 
Market Operator ("PIMO"), which makes its first appearance in these 
investigations. This article demonstrates the relationship between the two and 
whether both can be used as a benchmark for the purposes of the State aid rules 
as laid down under Art. 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union ("TFEU"). 
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ANALYSING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISIONS ON
APPLE, STARBUCKS, AMAZON AND FIAT FINANCE & TRADE 
Franklin Cachia239 
1. Introduction
The European Commission (Hereinafter referred to as 'EC') opened three in­
depth investigations to examine whether decisions by tax authorities in Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg with regard to the corporate income tax to be 
paid by Apple,240 Starbucks,241 Amazon,242 and Fiat Finance & Trade,243 comply
with the European Union (Hereinafter referred to as 'EU') rules on State aid. 
More recently, the EC opened a formal investigation into Luxembourg's tax 
treatment of McDonald's.244 On the 21st of October 2015, the EC decided that
both Luxembourg and the Netherlands had granted selective tax advantages to 
Fiat Finance and Trade and Starbucks respectively through tax rulings.245 
Finally, on the 30th of August 2016, the EC issued a press release whereby it 
concluded that Ireland granted undue tax benefits of up to €13 billion to 
Apple.246 Tax rulings as such are not problematic as they are comfort letters by 
tax authorities giving a specific company legal certainty on how its corporate tax 
will be calculated or on the use of special tax provisions. However, tax rulings 
may involve state aid within the meaning of EU rules if they are used to provide 
selective advantages to a specific company or group of companies.247 
According to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, State aid which affects trade between 
Member States and threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
239 Franklin Cachia is a member of the International Tax Law department at Francis J. Vassallo 
& Associates Limited (Malta). This article is based on the Adv LLM paper the author 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of Advanced Studies in 
International Tax Law degree at the International Tax Center Leiden (Leiden University). 
The author was supervised by Dr. Rita Szudczky. 
240 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014]. 
241 Alleged aid to Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014]. 
242 Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014]. 
243 Alleged aid to FFTSA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final [2014]. 
244 European Commission, 'State aid: Commission opens formal investigationinto Luxembourg's 
tax treatment of McDonalds' (European Commission: Press, 11 November 2015) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6221_en.htm> accessed 10 March 2015. 
245 European Commission, 'Commission decides selective tax advantages for Fiat in 
Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are illegal under EU state aid rules' 
(European Commission: Press Release, 21 October 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press­
release_lP-15-5880_en.htm> accessed 10 March 2015. 
246 European Commission: Press Release, 30 August 2016. The non-confidential version of the 
decisions will be made available under the case number SA.38373 in the State aid register 
on the DG Competition website once any confidentiality issues have been resolved 
247 Alleged aid to FFT SA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final [2014]. 
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undertakings is in principle incompatible with the EU Single Market. Tax rulings 
are used in particular to confirm transfer pricing arrangements through a form of 
tax ruling known as Advanced Pricing Arrangement (Hereinafter referred to as 
'APA'). If tax authorities, when accepting the calculation of the taxable basis 
proposed by a company, insist on a remuneration of a subsidiary or a branch on 
market terms, reflecting normal conditions of competition, this would exclude 
the presence of state aid. However, if the calculation is not based on 
remuneration on market terms, it could imply a more favourable treatment of 
the company compared to the treatment other taxpayers would normally receive 
under the Member States' tax rules. This may constitute state aid. 
Normally, the Arm's Length Principle (Hereinafter referred to as 'ALP') is the 
standard used to determine the correct transfer price. The EC acknowledges that 
market conditions may be arrived at through transfer pricing established 
through the ALP. However, the EC seems to be applying a standard which goes 
over and above the ALP to determine whether the transfer pricing calculations 
are at normal market conditions. This new standard is the Prudent Independent 
Market Operator (Hereinafter referred to as 'PIMO') standard which makes its 
appearance for the first time in the four cases.248 As we shall see the PIMO has 
similarities, not only to the ALP but also to other tests and principles previously 
advocated by the EU courts.249 Furthermore, in the Starbucks final decision the 
EC is applying the legal principle of equal tax treatment, which according to the 
EC is reflective of the ALP. 
2. Transfer Pricing and The Arm's Length Principle (ALP): A General
Note
Transfer pricing refers to the setting of the correct transfer price between 
associated enterprises forming part of a multinational enterprise (Hereinafter 
referred to as 'MNE') group.zso Transfer pricing by itself does not necessarily
involve tax avoidance. It is where the transfer pricing does not accord with 
applicable international norms that mispricing or incorrect pricing occurs, and 
where issues of tax avoidance and fraud may arise.2s1 
248 Apple recitals 53 and 54; Starbucks recitals 74 and 75; Amazon recitals 53, 54 and 64; FFT 
recitals 60 and 61. 
249 Case 124/10 European Commission v Electricite de France (EDF) [2012] (GC), paras 59, 60 
and 80; the Prudent Private Investor Test and the Market Economy Agent Test. 
250 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD, 1995) para 12. 
251" United Nations, 'Practical Manual on Trnasfer Pricing for Developing Countries' 
(ST/ESA/347, United Nations 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf> accessed 8 
March 2015. 
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In order to ensure the determination of the correct transfer pricing between 
associated enterprises, OECD Member States have chosen to treat each entity in 
the MNE as a separate entity. This separate entity approach is the most
reasonable means for achieving equitable results and minimising the risk of 
unrelieved double taxation. In order to apply the separate entity approach to 
intra-group transactions, individual group members must be taxed on the basis 
that they act at arm's length in their transactions with each other. However, the 
relationship amongst the members of the MNEs may permit that they establish 
special conditions between themselves, which do not reflect and/or differ from 
normal market conditions between independent enterprises. To ensure the 
correct application of the separate entity approach, OECD member countries 
adopted the ALP, under which the effect of special conditions on the levels of 
profits should be eliminated.2s2 
2.1 Jnterpretation and Application of the ALP 
The general rule is that, 'profits derived by an enterprise of a contracting State 
are taxable only by the contracting State in which the enterprise has its 
residence'.253 Article 9(1) in the OECD Model Convention, allows the State to 
depart from these general rules by adjusting profits accruing to a domestic 
enterprise, which is associated with a foreign enterprise, to the extent that the 
business profits concerned were affected by terms and conditions differing from 
normal market conditions between independent enterprises.254 Article 9 
concerns the question of whether an element of profit, which has been subjected 
to tax in the foreign contracting State, may nevertheless be attributed to, and 
taxed in the hands of a domestic enterprise. Consequently, Article 9 is designed 
to avoid economic double taxation.2ss Article 9 allows such a rewriting of 
accounts, that is, reallocation of profits to be made only according to the ALP. 
Whether or not that contracting State may avail itself of this treaty authorization, 
depends on its own domestic law. 
According to Vogel,256 Article 9 does not create any legal basis for such a 
rewriting of accounts. Like any other article of a tax treaty, its effects are to 
restrict domestic law to the extent that the latter provides for profit adjustments 
between associated enterprises beyond those permissible under the ALP. 
252 Alleged aid to FFTSA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final [2014] preface, para 6. 
253 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014), art 7. 
254 Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2015) 
555. 
255 ibid. See also Lioubov Pogorelova, 'Transfer Pricing and Anti-Abuse Rules' (2009) 37 
lntertax 683, 683-693. 
256 Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions ( 4th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2015) 
517. 
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Therefore, a State may not rely solely on Article 9 of a tax treaty concluded with 
another State to enforce the ALP but it needs to implement the ALP in its 
domestic law. This is important to keep in mind for the Irish investigation 
concerning Apple Inc., whereby there were no transfer pricing rules 
implemented within the Irish domestic tax law. When considering the treaty 
rules corresponding to Article 9, it should again be noted that the tax treaty 
merely restricts, rather than generates, domestic law. The only legal basis for 
profit adjustments between associated enterprises are therefore, the rules of 
domestic law. 
The ALP provides that, the conditions made or imposed between associated 
enterprises must be compared with those which would be agreed between 
independent enterprises, thus a comparability analysis taking into account 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, must be performed. There 
is above all a concrete possibility to make a comparison whenever a market price 
exists and can be ascertained, at a certain point in time and in a specific market 
for the, inter alia, goods and services received. If there is no such possibility to 
make a comparison, an attempt must be made to estimate by other means what 
would have been agreed between third parties that are independent of each 
other in the absence of any influence under company law. This comparison is 
necessarily a hypothetical one.2s1 What must be taken in consideration is that the 
price is founded on certain market situations independent of the association of 
the two enterprises. Another point to be observed in the comparability analysis 
is the function, which the dependent enterprise has within the group as a 
whole.zsa For providing concrete basis for comparisons, certain standard 
methods have been developed for establishing the Arm's Length price.2s9
3. Fiscal State Aid
One of the main objectives of the EU is market integration, that is, it is a union 
'where capital, labour, technology and enterprises should move unhindered 
between participating countries'.260 State aid provisions, as part of the TFEU,
should be regarded as having as a final objective market integration. They aim to 
promote and ensure, undistorted competition in a free market, thereby 
strengthening the internal market. State aid rules ensure this by controlling State 
interventions aimed to provide economic assistance to undertakings on a 
selective basis. 
257 ibid 527. 
258 ibid 528. 
259 For a detailed reading of the methods advocated by the OECD, see Chapter II of the TPG and 
US I.R.C. Sec 482. See also Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions ( 4th edn, 
Wolters Kluwer 2015) 530-535. 
260 Ali M. El-Agraa, The European Union: Economics and Politics (7th edn, Prentice Hall 2004) 2. 
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According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Hereinafter referred to as 'CJEU'), within the EU, direct taxation has been left 
within the competence of the Member States. However, Member States must 
exercise such taxing powers within the parameters set by the supremacy of EU 
Iaw.261 In order to achieve this, it is necessary that two main sets of primary EU
Jaw rules are adhered to, namely, the rules protecting the fundamental freedoms 
and those that prohibit state aid set out in Articles 107-108 TFEU.262 Both sets of
rules aim to avoid distortion of competition with the EU internal market. State 
aid rules provide for an immediate prohibition of direct and indirect use of 
public resources for promoting national goods and undertakings, based on 
prudent estimation of the effect that a measure of this type may have on the 
functioning of the internal market.263 Moreover, the ground for expansion of
state aid control in the tax area was defined by the 1998 Commission's Notice,264
however, the Court had long before recognised this from the very beginning of its 
case law when it held that the concept of State aid should be interpreted broadly 
encompassing fiscal measures.265 Thus, in principle, State aid distorts 
competition, and fiscal aid is one form of state aid. 
3.1 The EC's Competence in State Aid Cases 
The EC is the supervising authority in charge of reviewing the compatibility of 
aids within the internal market, however, the EC is not the only protagonist in 
State aid review procedures. According to Article 108(2) TFEU, the Council has 
also the opportunity to decide the compatibility of an aid. The compatibility 
decision should be voted unanimously at a Member State's request. It is a 
derogatory regime which departs from the normal procedure, thus it can only 
arise under exceptional circumstances. In tax matters this has been used in the 
Belgian Coordination Centres case.266 Moreover, apart from the Council, the
CJEU plays a decisive role by reviewing the EC's decisions. Even though the EC is 
261 In the context of free movement provisions e.g. Case C-307 /97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 
Zweigniedelassung Deautschland vs. Finanzamt Aachen-lnnenstadt [1999] ECR 1-6181 para 
57; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer vs. David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) 
[2006] ECR 1-10837 para 29; Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas vs. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] ECR 1-07995 para 40. 
262 "Pasquale Pistone, 'Smart Tax Competition and the Geographical, Boundaries of Taxing 
Jurisdictions: Countering, Selective Advantages Amidst Disparities' (2012) 40 lntertax 85. 
263 Claire Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2014) 36-39. 
264 Commission Notice of 10 December 1998 on the application of state aid rules to measures 
relating to direct business taxation [1998] OJ C384. 
265 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijenen in Limburg vs. High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 1 para 19; Case C-387 /92 Banco de Credito 
Industrial SA vs. Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] ECR 1-00877 paras 13-14; Case C-241/94 
French Republic vs. Commission of the European Communities [1996] ECR 1-4551 para 34. 
266 Commission Decision of 17 February 2003 on the aid scheme implemented by Belgium for 
coordination centres established in Belgium [2003] OJ L282. 
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vested with exclusive jurisdiction to review the compatibility of the measure 
with the internal market, the CJEU overseas the EC's review to ensure that the 
procedural rules have been respected, the reasoning was sufficient, the facts 
were exact and there was no manifest error of assessment or misuse of power.267
Naturally, the CJEU also has the competence to interpret authoritatively the 
concept of State aid under Article 107(1). 
3.2 The Measures of Tax Settlements and Rulings for State Aid 
Purposes 
All of the four cases deal with a tax ruling or APA which confirms a particular 
transaction or structure and through this validation by the Member State an aid 
is conferred. In its final decision, the EC noted that the tax rulings under 
investigation endorsed artificial and complex methods to establish taxable 
profits for the companies which did not reflect economic reality. According to 
Keyln Bacon, 'an aid to an individual undertaking is obviously selective'.268 One
of the main advantages of tax rulings and AP As is the legal certainty they provide 
to all parties involved and this is also acknowledged by the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines (Hereinafter referred to as 'TPG'). Therefore, one may 
question how such an instrument can fall within the provisions of the State aid 
rules. On this point, paragraph 22 of the EC 1998 Notice clarifies that, as far as 
administrative rulings merely contain an interpretation of general rules, they do 
not give rise to the presumption of aid. 
Furthermore, the 1998 Notice provides that every decision of the administration 
that departs from the general tax rules to the benefit of individual undertakings 
in principle leads to a presumption of State aid. This has also been repeated in 
the EC Draft Notice269 and subsequently finalised on the 19 May 2016 whereby 
the EC published its final notice.270The EC Final Notice acknowledged that the
use of rulings was used in determining arm's length profits for related party 
transactions where the uncertainty may justify an advance ruling practice 
designed to ascertain whether certain controlled transactions are conducted at 
arm's length. The EC Final Notice outlines that tax rulings should only aim to 
provide legal certainty to the fiscal treatment of certain transactions and should 
267 Hofmann H. Morini A, 1udicial Review of Commission decision in State Aid' in Erika 
Szyszczak (ed), Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Edgar 2011) 354-
389; Edoardo Gambaro, 'The Judicial Phase' in Alberto Santa Maria ( ed), Competition and 
State Aid (Kluwer Law International 2007) 221-262. 
268 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid (2nd edn, OUP 2013). 
269 Commission, 'Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) 
TFEU' (Communication). 
27
° Commission Notice of 19 July 2016 on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C262. 
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not have the effect of granting the undertakings concerned lower taxation that 
other undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation but which were not 
granted such rulings. From this paragraph we infer that the EC wants to suggest 
that the comparison test is not between two undertakings obtaining a tax ruling 
but between an undertaking which obtains a tax ruling, and one which doesn't. 
The EC Final Notice goes on to say that rulings are selective in particular where, 
the tax authorities have discretion in granting administrative rulings, the rulings 
are not available to undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation, the 
administration appears to apply a more favourable discretionary tax treatment 
compared with other taxpayers in a similar factual and legal situation and the 
ruling has been issued in contradiction to the applicable tax provisions and 
resulted in a lower amount of tax.271 In the Starbucks final decision, the EC 
clarifies that group companies and stand-alone companies are to be treated 
similarly in order to avoid any selective advantage which may constitute State 
aid. 
The first case involving administrative discretion was France vs. Commission.272 
The EC first noted that, as a result of the agreement concluded between the State 
(Hereinafter referred to as 'FNE') and Kimberly Clark, the FNE undertook to fund 
part of the cost of the social plan to the extent of FF 27.25 million. The EC 
considered that the FNE intervention constituted State aid, since such 
agreements are negotiated with undertakings encountering employment 
problems and the FNE contribution, which is financed out of the State budget, is 
determined case by case by reference to the financial situation of the 
undertaking and the latter's own efforts. 
AG Jacobs in his opinion states that it is clear that the state's discretion enables it 
to benefit 'certain' undertakings by agreeing or refusing to enter into 
agreements, by modifying the level of its contribution or by dispensing the 
undertaking from its financial participation.273 He goes on to say that by virtue of 
the existence of and degree of discretion, the contributions are not in fact 
necessarily available to all undertakings on an equal footing.274 He agrees with
the EC and argues that the existence and degree of discretion in the 
administration of the FNE scheme takes it outside the definition of a general 
measure; any specific implementation may therefore constitute aid. He takes the 
view that the specific intervention in favour of Kimberly Clark, the subject of the 
decision being challenged, has the character of aid. The Court also agrees with 
271 ibid paras 169-174. 
272 Case C-241/94 French Republic vs. Commission of the European Communities [1996] ECR 1-
4551. 
273 ibid Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs. 
274 ibid para 57. 
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the EC in that the FNE enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to adjust its 
financial assistance having regard to a number of considerations such as, in 
particular, the choice of beneficiaries, the amount of the financial assistance and 
the conditions under which it is provided.275 
Following Kimberly Clark, the Court has endorsed this principle in various other 
judgments. In Ecotrade,276 the Court held that having regard to the class of 
undertakings covered by the legislation in issue and the scope of the discretion 
enjoyed by the minister when authorising, in particular, an insolvent 
undertaking under special administration to continue trading, that legislation 
meets the condition that it relates to a specific undertaking and is therefore 
selective, selectivity being one of the elements of State aid as defined in 
Article107(1).277 In Rinaldo Piaggio,21a the Court confirmed the same exact 
principle as in Ecotrade. In DMT,279 the Court outlined that general measures 
which do not favour only certain undertakings or the production of only certain 
goods do not fall within that provision. By contrast, where the body granting 
financial assistance enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to choose the 
beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided, 
that assistance cannot be considered to be general in nature. Furthermore in 
Lenzing,2ao the court pointed out that case-law has already established that even 
assistance which at first sight is applicable to undertakings in general may 
present a certain selectivity and, accordingly, be regarded as a measure intended 
to favour certain undertakings or certain products. That is the case, in particular, 
where the administration called upon to apply the general rule has discretion 
when applying the measure. More recently, the Court gave further clarification 
on the degree of latitude or discretion in P Oy.2s1 
In terms of the above, it can thus be concluded that individual rulings by tax 
authorities do not constitute State aid if they are no more than interpretations 
and practical applications of general tax rules through administrative discretion 
on the basis of objective criteria.282 Treating taxpayers on a discretionary basis 
may mean that a general measure becomes selective, particularly where the 
exercise of the discretionary power goes beyond the simple management of tax 
21s ibid paras 23-24. 
276 Case C-200/97 Ecotrade Sri vs. Altiforni e Ferriere di Servo/a SpA (AFSJ [1998] ECR 1-7907. 
277 ibid para 40. 
278 Case C-295/97 lndustrie aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA vs. International 
Factors Italia SpA (lfitalia) [1996] ECR 1-3735 para. 39. 
279 Case C-256/97 Demenagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT) [1999] ECR 1-3919, para 
27. 
28° Case T-36/99 Lenzing AG vs. Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR 11-3609. 
281 Case C-6/12 P Dy [2013] ECR 1-525, paras 22-30. 
282 Ben J.M. Terra, European Tax law (6th edn, Kluwer Law International 2012)156. 
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�enue by reference to an objective system of reference.
283 According to Claire
<Micheau, the fact that national administrations enjoy discretion is a strong
indication of the selectivity of the measure.
284 Tax authorities have discretionary
power in applying a measure, in particular, where the criteria for granting the
aid are formulated in a very general or vague manner that necessarily involves a
margin of discretion in the assessment. If the competent tax authorities have a
broad discretion to determine the beneficiaries or the conditions under which
the tax advantage is granted on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, 
the exercise of that discretion hints at favouring 'certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods'.285 Decisions by the administration that depart from
the general tax rules and benefit individual undertakings lead in principle to a
presumption of State aid and must be analysed in detail.286
3.3 Transfer Pricing Decisions by the EC in the Light of the State Aid 
Rules 
The selectivity test has been difficult to apply in cases dealing with transfer
pricing schemes.287 The TPG establish that to arrive at the correct arm's length
transfer price one may use five alternative methods or else any other method,
which is compatible with the ALP. To appraise the advantage in cases involving
transfer pricing methods, the EC has taken as guidance the TPG, as it does again 
in the pending cases. It has expressly stated that 'in the area of transfer pricing 
the internationally agreed standard is the arm's length principle as set out in 
Article 9 OECD Model.'288 We have noted that almost all EC decisions on State aid 
concerning transfer pricing, dealt with the special scheme concerning 
coordination centres which has been implemented in various Member States. 
The scheme provides that the taxable income is calculated by using the 'Cost 
Plus' method, which is a method recommended by the OECD TPG. The EC's 2004
203 Case C-241/94 French Republic vs. Commission of the European Communities [1996) ECR 1-
4551, paras 23-24. 
204 Claire Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2014) 233. 
20s Case C-6/12 P Oy [2013) ECR 1-525, para 27. 
286 Raymond H.C. Luja, '(Re)shaping Fiscal State Aid: Selected Recent Cases and Their Impact' 
(2012) 40 lntertax 120. 
287 Aid scheme implemented by Germany for control and coordination centres Commission 
Decision 2003/512/EC [2003) OJ Ll 77 /17; Case C-48/2001; Coordination Centres -
implemented by Luxembourg (Case C-49/2001) Commission Decision 2003/501/EC [2003) 
OJ L170/20; Luxembourg - Finance Companies (Case C-50/2001) Commission Decision 
2003/438/EC [2002) OJ L153/40; Belgium - Coordination Centres (Case C-15/2002) 
Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty [2003) OJ 
L282/25; Spain - Vizcaya coordination centres Commission Decision 2003/81/EC [2003) OJ 
L131/26. 
288 Aid scheme implemented by Germany for control and coordination centres Commission 
Decision 2003/512/EC [2003) OJ L177 /17. 
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Report2B9 clarifies that although this method as such is not caught by the State
aid provisions per se, it can give rise to an advantage where the tax arrangements 
applied do not take proper account of the economic reality ( or normal market 
conditions) of the transactions and thereby result in a lower rate of taxation than 
if the standard tax method had been applied. In this respect we will see if this 
departure from the standard tax method may mean a departure from the ALP 
thus reflecting the issue in the pending State aid cases. For the purposes of this 
part we shall look at the decisions concerning France, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Belgium. Belgium brought an action for annulment of the EC decision in front of 
the Courts, that is, the Belgium and Forum 187 case, which we have mentioned 
already, and which we shall look at more closely from a transfer pricing point of 
view. We also note that all the schemes in question were implemented into 
national law and that specific legal regime derogated from the general tax 
system. 
In the scheme adopted by France for headquarters and logistics centres,29o the
scheme makes it possible to determine profits subject to corporation tax in an 
alternative manner, using the cost-plus method as opposed to the ordinary 
manner to calculate the taxable profits. The EC found that the scheme is selective 
on three grounds, namely, firstly, the measure is limited to supplies of services 
which correspond to the functions of management, administration, coordination 
or control and to activities preparatory or ancillary to productive or commercial 
functions performed in the context of an international group. Only the former 
activities are therefore capable of benefiting from the advantages identified. 
Secondly, the benefit of the scheme is limited exclusively to headquarters and 
logistics centres which provide their services predominantly to associated 
companies situated outside France. The EC noted that entities which do not 
provide their services predominantly to associated companies located outside 
France are excluded from the benefit of the measure. Thus, entities established in 
France but not satisfying the predominance condition cannot benefit from the 
advantages of the scheme despite the fact that in their transactions with 
associated companies or branches situated abroad they must face the same 
difficulties as headquarters and logistics centres in determining their taxable 
profits. Thirdly, the fact that logistics centres constituting a department attached 
to an industrial or commercial branch of activity of an existing enterprise or to a 
holding company are excluded from the scheme strengthens the selectivity of the 
measure.291 The same reasoning was advocated in the scheme adopted by
289 Commission, Report on the Implementation of the Commission Notice on the Application of 
the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation (C(2004)434). 
29
° French headquarters and logistic centres Commission Decision [2003] OJ L23/1. 
291 ibid paras 65-67. 
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Luxembourg regarding coordination centres,292 and similarly another
Luxembourg scheme concerning finance companies,293, together with the
Spanish scheme concerning coordination centres in Vizcaya,294 In the decision
against Luxembourg the EC examined whether the method of determining the 
mark-up rate, the exclusion of certain expenditure from the calculation of the tax 
base and the exercise of possible discretionary power by the administration 
might confer an advantage on coordination centres. Similarly, in the decision 
against Spain, the EC considered that the exclusion of financial costs from the 
calculation of profits under the cost plus method could confer an advantage on 
coordination centres. 
The EC concluded that coordination centres and the groups to which they belong 
were able to derive an advantage by reason of the fact that, in practice, 
Luxembourg systematically granted the minimum rate of 5% without checking 
whether it corresponded to the economic reality of the underlying services. It 
transpires that the Luxembourg authorities failed, at least in some cases, to 
ensure that coordination centres were subject to taxation comparable to that 
which generally applied to enterprises liable for tax in Luxembourg, that is, those 
which do not fall under the scheme for coordination centres. Similarly, to the 
pending cases, most particularly Starbucks, the EC questions the economic 
rationale of the scheme. Moreover, such a fixed rate could have derogated 
(derogation test) from the reference system when compared to other enterprises 
which would not have been eligible for the scheme (comparability test).295
On selectivity, given that the tax provisions in question concerned only 
coordination centres belonging to multinational groups present in at least two 
countries other than Luxembourg and having their headquarters outside 
Luxembourg, only some enterprises had access to the advantages described 
above. Moreover, some tax advantages are on occasion restricted to certain 
functions, such as intra-group services. This also holds for the Luxembourg 
scheme for coordination centres. The criterion of selectivity is thus met. 
In Luxembourg's view, there is no precedent for applying the State aid rules to 
the choice of methods for calculating the tax base. Applying them in this way 
would involve a radical and unforeseeable extension of the current scope of 
Article 107 of the Treaty.296 The EC reiterated that such precedent is not
292 Coordination Centres - implemented by Luxembourg (Case C-49/2001) Commission 
Decision 2003/501/EC [2003] OJ L170/20. 
293 Luxembourg - Finance Companies (Case C-50/2001) Commission Decision 2003/438/EC 
[2002] OJ L153/40. 
294 Spain - Vizcaya coordination centres Commission Decision 2003/81/EC [2003] OJ L131/26. 
295 ibid paras 46-50. 
296 ibid para 38. 
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necessary (and this is also applicable for the pending cases). When it comes to 
reconciling the principle of legal certainty with that of full competition and 
providing taxpayers with a point of reference, there is nothing to prevent tax 
administrations from opting for the cost-plus pricing formula. The Commission is 
not criticising the use of that system as a means of facilitating the determination 
of transfer prices for transactions between associated entities. Nevertheless, in 
the case at issue, the systematic application of the 5% minimum rate must be 
regarded as a derogation from the correct use of the cost-plus pricing method 
which is liable to have conferred an advantage on some enterprises without 
being justified by the nature or general scheme of the system.297 We therefore 
infer that the cost plus method is the reference framework in this case and that a 
fixed rate or 'safe harbour' is a derogation from it. 
Finally, the Belgian Coordination Ventres decision,298 which reached the Courts
in Belgium and Forum 187,299 sheds more light on the interpretation of transfer 
pricing within EU. In this case, the Belgian authorities recommended that, in the 
absence of any objective criteria for determining the percentage of profits to be 
taken into account, a mark-up of 8% should be used, whatever the type of service 
provided and without any checks being made as to whether this corresponded to 
economic reality. First, the court points out that a centre's taxable income is 
determined at a standard rate according to the cost-plus method. It represents a 
percentage of the total operating expenses and costs, from which staff costs, 
financial charges and corporation tax are excluded. This constitutes a derogation 
from the ordinary Belgian tax system. In this point, the EC took the flat-rate 
assessment of income under the cost-plus method constitutes an economic 
advantage. Under the regime in question, taxable profits are set at a flat-rate 
amount which represents a percentage of the full amount of operating costs and 
expenses, from which staff costs and financial charges are excluded.300 
In order to decide whether a method of assessment of taxable income such as 
that laid down under the regime for coordination centres confers an advantage 
on them, it is necessary, to compare that regime with the ordinary tax system, 
based on the difference between profits and outgoings of an undertaking 
carrying on its activities in conditions of free competition.301
297 ibid para 57. 
298 Belgium - Coordination Centres (Case C-15/2002) Invitation to submit comments pursuant 
to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L282/25. 
299 Belgian Coordination Centres Commission Decision 2003/755/EC [2003] OJ L282, 55, 
recitals 89 - 95; Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217 /03 Belgium and Forum 187 vs. 
Commission [2006] ECR 1-5479. 
300 Belgium - Coordination Centres (Case C-15/2002) Invitation to submit comments pursuant 
to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L282/25. 
301 ibid para 95. 
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With respect to selectivity and as regards the method of determining taxable 
income, while Forum 187 argues that the regime in question applies to those 
companies for which it was specifically designed, 302 so that the risk of double
taxation may be avoided, it is a matter of agreement that the regime applies only 
to international groups having subsidiaries which are established in at least four 
different countries, which have capital and reserves of at least BEF 1000 million, 
and have an annual consolidated turnover of at least BEF 10,000 million. It 
follows that the regime in question is also selective in that regard.303 Ultimately 
the Court annulled the EC decision but not on grounds that the measure did not 
constitute aid. 
By way of conclusion to this part and for the purposes of the pending cases, the 
EC's 2004 Report clarified that to determine whether a tax scheme derogating 
from the normal system may constitute State aid, it must be established whether 
the resulting tax burden is lower than that which would have resulted from the 
application of the relevant Member's States normal taxation method. We 
therefore infer that in derogating from the normal tax method (which may also 
be the cost plus method without the use of fixed margins as demonstrated in the 
EC decisional practice above) one must compare the tax burden of undertakings 
calculated by the normal tax method and the tax burden of undertakings 
calculated by the alternative method. The normal tax system in the EC's TP 
decisional practice seems to be the correct application of the cost plus method 
without the use of fixed margins. On various occasions the EC referred to the ALP 
in its decision. Thus, for example, in the French decision the EC acknowledged 
that the arm's length principle is the international standard agreed by OECD 
member countries to determine transfer prices for tax purposes with a view to 
avoiding, firstly, double taxation of taxable income and, secondly, tax evasion 
involving the same income. The EC also acknowledges that the French tax system 
did in fact comply with the ALP as regards the determination of taxable profits in 
international transactions between controlled enterprises, both at the level of 
domestic law, under Article 57 of the General Tax Code, and at that of the 
bilateral double taxation treaties concluded by France with its partner 
countries.304We also note in the Belgian decision that the advantage here derives
from the fact that the tax administration refrains explicitly from monitoring the 
'at arm's length' nature of operations between FSC and affiliated companies once 
the minimum mark-up is reached. This approach, together with a small mark-up, 
reduces the level of corporation tax compared with the conventional method for 
302 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217 /03 Belgium and Forum 187 vs. Commission [2006] ECR 1-
5479. 
303 Case C-15/2002 Belgium - Coordination Centres [2003] OJ L 282/25 paras. 119-121. 
304 Belgium - Coordination Centres (Case C-15/2002) Invitation to submit comments pursuant 
to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty [2003] OJ L282/25, para 45. 
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determining taxable income.305 From this we conclude that even though not
specifically mentioned in the decisions outlined above, the EC acknowledges the 
ALP as the correct standard to be used between related party transactions and 
may be used as a benchmark. We infer that the application of fixed margins and 
the exclusion of certain costs to which the margins are applied deviates from the 
correct application of the ALP as interpreted by the OECD TPG. In this respect, 
we may also infer that such decisions may be used as precedents for the pending 
State aid cases. 
4. The Prudent Independent Market Operator (PIMO)
4.1 Understanding the PIMO in the State Aid Cases 
In the four State aid cases, on several occasions, reference is made by the EC to a 
relatively new principle (this however does not seem to transpire in the EC's 
final Starbucks decision); the Prudent Independent Market Operator, in 
particular the phrases 'transactions between prudent market operators' and 
'conditions prevailing between prudent market operators'. The EC states that, 
Tax authorities, by accepting that multinational companies depart from 
market conditions in setting the commercial conditions of intra-group 
transactions through a discretionary practice of tax rulings, may renounce 
taxable revenues in their jurisdiction and thereby forego State resources, 
in particular when accepting commercial conditions which depart from 
conditions prevailing between prudent independent operators.306 
Moreover, 
Thus, where a ruling concerns transfer pricing arrangements between 
related companies within a corporate group, that arrangement should not 
depart from the arrangement or remuneration that a prudent independent 
operator acting under normal market conditions would have accepted.307 
Furthermore, 
3os ibid para 12. 
306 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final (2014) recitals 53 and 54; Alleged aid to 
Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final (2014] recitals 74 and 75; Alleged aid to Amazon by 
way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014) recitals 53, 54 and 64; Alleged aid to FFT 
SA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final [2014) recitals 60 and 61. 
307 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014) recitals 53 and 54; Alleged aid to 
Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final (2014) recitals 74 and 75; Alleged aid to Amazon by 
way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014) recitals 53, 54 and 64; Alleged aid to FFT 
SA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final (2014) recitals 60 and 61. 
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when accepting a calculation method of the taxable basis proposed by the 
taxpayer, the tax authorities should compare that method to the prudent 
behaviour of a hypothetical market operator, which would require a 
market conform remuneration of a subsidiary or a branch, which reflect 
normal conditions of competition. For example, a market operator would 
not accept that its revenues are based on a method which achieves the 
lowest possible outcome if the facts and circumstances of the case could 
justify the use of other, more appropriate methods.3os
Finally, in Amazon the EC states that, 
although, as the Luxembourgish authorities rightly argue, the OECD 
Guidelines provide some flexibility with respect to the application of the 
arm's length principle, that flexibility is limited by the principle that the 
remuneration arrived at should reflect what a prudent independent 
operator acting under normal market conditions would have accepted.309 
When looking closely at the last citation, it seems that the EC is invoking a 
principle which goes beyond the ALP, that is, a stricter or higher standard. 
Furthermore, this last citation further suggests that the EC seems to be replacing 
the ALP, which is the internationally accepted standard, which would normally 
govern a related party transaction, with the PIMO standard. However, in the 
Apple press release and the Starbucks final decision, there is no reference to the 
PIMO and the emphasis is being done on the fact the rulings approve 
transactions which are artificial and do not reflect economic reality 
We highlight that the PIMO is practically unknown. There is no guidance by the 
EC on this standard and no EU court has ever opined or deliberated on the PIMO, 
moreover, the literature on the PIMO is also very limited hence it will be very 
difficult to properly define it and correctly understand how the EC is trying to 
use this standard. Nevertheless, it seems that the EC seems to be applying a 
variant of the Market Economy Operator (Hereinafter referred to as MEO) test 
which arises from the EC Final Notice. 
We conclude that the MEO is applied onto the public authorities to measure their 
behaviour in comparable normal market conditions to assess whether economic 
transactions carried out by public authorities confer an advantage whereas the 
EC is applying the PIMO, either in aggregation, by way of reinforcement of the 
308 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014) recitals 56 and 57; Alleged aid to 
Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014) recitals 77 and 78. 
309 Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014]recital 61. 
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ALP or in replacement of the ALP, between related private undertakings in a 
similar fashion to the ALP. We also conclude that it would be not correct to 
replace an internationally accepted standard such as the ALP with an unknown 
one to determine what would constitute 'normal' market conditions. In relation 
to the pending State aid cases, it seems that the EC is using the PIMO to 
determine whether the transfer pricing arrangements between subsidiaries 
within the same corporate group depart from arrangements that a prudent 
independent operator acting under normal market conditions would have 
accepted. In this context, market conditions refer to transfer pricing established 
at arm's length. Thus the PIMO cannot be synonymous to the MEO test outlined 
in the EC Final notice as the latter's application addresses a different tester. 
5. The Final State Aid Decisions: Apple, Starbucks, Amazon and Fiat
Finance and Trade ("FFT")
5.1 The EC's Main Arguments, Interpretation and Reasoning 
In all the four cases the EC was of the opinion that the contested tax rulings or 
APAs do not comply with the ALP. If proven that the tax rulings do not adhere to 
the ALP, this would mean that the tax rulings lowered the undertakings' tax 
liability, thereby granting an advantage to the undertakings.310 Accordingly, the 
EC is of the opinion that through those tax rulings the tax authorities confer an 
advantage. Moreover, that advantage is obtained every year and on-going, when 
the annual tax liability is agreed upon by the tax authority in view of the ruling. 
The EC emphasises that rulings should not have the effect of granting the 
undertakings concerned lower taxation than other undertakings in a similar legal 
and factual situation. Tax authorities, by accepting that multinational companies 
depart from market conditions in setting the commercial conditions of intra­
group transactions through a discretionary practice of tax rulings, may renounce 
taxable revenues in their jurisdiction and thereby forego State resources, in 
particular when accepting commercial conditions which depart from conditions 
prevailing between prudent independent operators.311 
The EC argues that treating taxpayers on a discretionary basis through tax 
rulings may mean that the individual application of a general measure takes on 
310 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014) recital 48; Alleged aid to Starbucks 
SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014) recital 69; Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling 
SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014) recital 48; Alleged aid to FFT SA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final 
[2014) recital 54. 
311 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014) recital 53; Alleged aid to Starbucks 
SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014) recitals 74; Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling 
SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014) recital 56; Alleged aid to FFT SA.38375 C(2014) 3627 final 
[2014) recital 59. 
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the features of a selective measure, particularly where the exercise of the 
discretionary power goes beyond the simple management of tax revenue by 
reference to objective criteria. If, instead of issuing a ruling, the tax 
administration simply accepted a method of taxation based on prices which 
departs from conditions prevailing between prudent independent operators, 
there would also be State aid. The main problem is not the ruling as such, but the
acceptance of a method of taxation which does not reflect market principles.312 
The EC considered that the imputability and State resources conditions were
satisfied as the rulings were issued by the tax authorities, which are part of the 
State. Those rulings gave rise to a loss of State resources since any reduction of 
tax for the undertakings, resulted in a loss of revenue for the State. 313 The EC 
further considered that all the undertakings are globally active firms, operating 
in various Member States, so that any aid in their favour distorts or threatens to 
distort competition and has potential to affect intra-EU trade.314 
The EC goes on to say that, in the context of a related party transaction (that is a 
transaction between undertakings within the same group of companies), market 
conditions can be arrived at through transfer pricing established at arm's 
lengtb.315 The EC further acknowledges that the OECD TPG is the appropriate 
reference document for the approximation of an arm's length pricing outcome. It 
further states that the document has been previously used in the previous EC 
decisions.316
The EC concluded that the ALP requirement was not met by providing different 
reasons in each case accordingly as follows. In Apple, the EC stated that the 
taxable basis in the 1991 ruling was negotiated rather than substantiated by 
reference to comparable transactions. The Irish Revenue accepted the 
calculation of profit attributable to the branch on the basis of actual costs 
without this choice being reasoned in any way. The fact that the methods used to 
312 ibid. 
313 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014] recital 49; Alleged aid to Starbucks 
SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014] recitals 70; Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling 
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[2014] recital 56. 
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determine profit allocation result from a negotiation rather than a pncmg 
methodology, reinforces the idea that the outcome of the agreed method is not 
arm's length and that a prudent independent market operator would not have 
accepted the remuneration allocated to the branches in the same situation. No 
transfer pricing report was included in the documents provided by the Irish 
authorities to support the calculation of taxable profits as confirmed in that 
ruling, which is a common manner by which a transfer pricing proposal is made 
to tax authorities.317 The EC had also doubts as to the appropriateness of the
transfer pricing method chosen as the choice of that particular net profit 
indicator is neither explained by the tax advisor nor by Irish Revenue.318
The EC further outlines that the mark-up of 65% of the costs attributable to the 
Irish branch appear to be reverse engineered so as to arrive at a taxable income 
of around USO [28-38] million, although according the figure of USO [28-38] 
million does not have any economic substance.319 Moreover, it is important to
mention that as regarding the duration of the 1991 ruling, this ruling was applied 
by Apple for fifteen years without revision. This raised doubts as to the 
appropriateness of the method agreed between Irish Revenue and Apple to 
arrive to that allocation in the latter years of the ruling's application, given the 
possible changes to the economic environment and required remuneration 
levels. The EC notes, in particular, that that duration is much longer than the 
length of APAs concluded by other Member States.320
In Starbucks, the EC's first set of doubts relates to the fact that the arm's length 
remuneration accepted in the APA depends on Starbucks Manufacturing BV 
being classified as a low-risk toll manufacturer, despite evidence pointing to the 
contrary.321 The EC TP argument mostly concerned this classification. It then
went on to outline another issue concerning adjustments made to the Starbuck's 
cost base. The EC had doubts on the appropriateness of those adjustments and 
gave very detailed reasons in this respect.322 Finally, with respect to the royalty
payment and choice of profit level indicator, the EC outlined that the fact that the 
royalties due by Starbucks Manufacturing BV to Alki LP are dependent on the 
difference between the remuneration established in the APA and the accounting 
pre-tax profit before the payment of the royalty, leads to a situation in which that 
royalty payment is calculated as profit in excess of the SMBV agreement and does 
not reflect the value of the IP.323 Accordingly, the EC is of the opinion that by
317 Alleged Aid to Apple SA.38373 C(2014) 3606 final [2014] recital 56. 
318 ibid recital 60. 
319 ibid recital 62. 
320 ibid recital 65. 
321 Alleged aid to Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final [2014] recitals 79-96. 
322 ibid recitals 97-114. 
323 ibid recital 115. 
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accepting Starbucks Manufacturing BV's use of the SMBV APAs as regards the 
calculation of royalties in its profit and loss statement, in so far as the level of 
those royalties could be overestimated in view of the value of the IP in question, 
the Dutch tax authorities conferred an advantage on that undertaking.324
In Amazon, (same as in Apple) the EC noted firstly that Luxembourg did not 
submit to the EC any transfer pricing report prepared by Amazon in support of 
the transfer pricing arrangement in the ruling.325 Furthermore, the EC expressed 
doubts as to whether the Luxembourgish tax authorities properly confirmed by 
the contested tax ruling that the transfer pricing arrangement presented in 
Amazon's ruling request reflected what a prudent independent operator acting 
under normal market conditions would have accepted. The EC further notes that 
the ruling request by Amazon was assessed within eleven working days from the 
receipt of the first letter constituting the ruling request, which is a very short 
period of time had a transfer pricing report been submitted and assessed in this 
case.326 Secondly, (same as in Starbucks) the EC doubted the choice of transfer 
pricing method. The method proposed by Amazon's tax advisor in the ruling 
request and accepted by the Luxembourgish tax authorities in the contested tax 
ruling does not seem to correspond to any of the methods listed in the OECD 
TPG. While those methods are not exhaustive, the EC has doubts, particularly in 
the absence of a transfer pricing report, whether the Luxembourgish tax 
authorities properly confirmed that the transfer pricing arrangement presented 
in Amazon's ruling request was in line with market conditions.327 The EC 
understood that the remuneration accepted in that ruling is still accepted as 
being at arm's length by the Luxembourgish tax authorities more than ten years 
later without any revision, thus this making the ruling not in line with normal 
market conditions.328 
Finally in FFT329 the EC claims that by agreeing to a taxable basis which can vary 
only marginally, the Luxembourgish tax authorities disregard any significant 
increase or decrease in the activities of FFT.330 It further criticises the choice of 
method and states that the transactional net margin method is one of two 
indirect methods for estimating the profit level according to the OECD 
m ibid recital 123. 
325 Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 [2014) recital 63. 
326 ibid recital 64. 
327 ibid recitals 65-71. 
328 ibid recital 7 6. 
329 This decision is being challenged before the General Court - T759/15, T-755/15. 'SA.38375 
State aid which Luxembourg granted to Fiat' (European Commission, 21 February 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_detai1s.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38375> 
accessed 10 March 2015. 
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Guidelines. However, according to the case law331 as well as those guidelines, the 
use of direct methods for setting an appropriate level of profits is preferred. In 
particular, it is acknowledged that, whenever possible, the comparable 
uncontrolled price method is best at approximating conditions prevailing 
between prudent independent operators.332 The EC further questions the capital
remunerated and on the method employed together with observing the level of 
remuneration in that that the Luxembourgish tax authorities accepted the 
comparables selected by the tax advisor for the determination of an appropriate 
beta in the transfer pricing report without making any effort to filter out names 
which might not be appropriate peers.333 
5.2 Analysis and Criticism of the EC's Reasoning 
5.2.1 The ALP as a Benchmark 
We noted that to appraise the advantage in cases involving transfer pricing 
methods, the EC has taken as guidance the TPG, as it does again in the pending 
cases, particularly the EC uses the internationally accepted principle, the ALP as 
its point of departure. The question is whether these transfer pricing decisions 
may be used as a precedent by the EC and indeed whether the ALP may be used 
as a benchmark. 
First of all, in the previous transfer pricing decisions, the ALP was embedded in 
the Member States' domestic 'normal' tax system, thus it may be safe to say that 
it can form part of the reference system of a Member State for the purposes of 
the first step in analysing selectivity. The EC pointed out in its final decisions 
concerning the Netherlands that the reference system consists of the general 
Dutch corporate income tax system regardless whether it is a group or a stand­
alone company. The Luxembourg decision outlined that with reference to the 
need to prevent tax avoidance and to the principle of full competition (the ALP), 
the Luxembourg authorities pointed out that Article 164 of the Law of 4 
December 196 7 on income tax constitutes the legislative basis for transfer prices. 
It was in this context that Circular 119 was adopted to facilitate the taxation of 
certain types of activity. The status of coordination centres is governed by 
Circular LIR No. 119 of 12 June 1989. The Circular stated that, for corporation tax 
purposes, the provision of intra-group services must generate an appropriate 
trading profit in line with the normal behaviour of a prudent manager in his 
relations with independent third parties (the ALP). To that end, taxable profit is 
331 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217 /03 Belgium and Forum 187 vs. Commission [2006] ECR 1-
5479, para 95. 
332 ibid recital 65. 
111 ibid recitals 66-77. 
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determined according to the cost-plus pricing method by applying a flat-rate 
mark-up. 
Secondly, on numerous occasions of these decisions the EC made reference to the 
ALP and the OECD TPG as being the point of reference for inter-party 
transactions. By way of example, in the Luxembourgish decision the EC states 
that in the area of transfer prices, this international principle (the ALP) is set out 
in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (and, in more detail, in the OECD 
TPG). Since an analysis requires individual facts and circumstances to be taken 
into account, the OECD TPG does not recommend the use of 'safe harbours' (such 
as fixed margins). Moreover, the EC pointed out that the systematic application 
of the 5% mark-up without checking if it corresponds to the economic reality of 
the underlying services, departs from the correct application of the ALP thus 
giving coordination centres an advantage when compared to enterprises not 
qualifying for the scheme. We have learnt that the EC did not criticise the use of 
the cost-plus method as laid down under the OECD TPG but rather this 
systematic application.334 Similarly in the Belgian decision, the EC stated that the
advantage here derives from the fact that the tax administration refrains 
explicitly from monitoring the 'at arm's length' nature of operations between FSC 
and affiliated companies once the minimum mark-up is reached. This approach, 
together with a small mark-up, reduces the level of corporation tax compared 
with the conventional method for determining taxable income amongst 
independent entities. 
At this point we note that the ALP as implemented in the respective Member 
State's domestic tax system was the departing point for the EC and was used as 
the reference framework. We also note that a fixed rate or 'safe harbour' is the 
derogation from the ALP because it does not reflect correctly the economic 
reality between independent parties. The EC questions the economic reality of 
the transactions, that is, that they do not reflect normal market conditions. The 
EC reiterated that the cost-plus method together with a fixed mark-up may lead 
to the economic reality being underestimated and therefore to the payment of 
less tax. We understand that, what determines the economic reality of a 
transaction is the ALP. A fixed mark-up is not really reflective of the ALP 
especially when the tax authorities do not check whether such a mark-up 
corresponds to the economic reality of the underlying services. 
Lastly, as we have mentioned above, in the pending State aid cases the EC quotes 
case law,335 and the previous EC's decisional practice,336 on transfer pricing to 
334 ibid para 57. 
335 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217 /03 Belgium and Forum 187 vs. Commission [2006] ECR 1-
5479, para 95. 
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reinforce its arguments and seems to be invoking a precedent that the ALP is the 
benchmark or at least part of the reference framework. The EC further 
emphasises that the principle which is being applied is a general European legal 
principle of equal tax treatment which is reflective of the ALP. The EC interprets 
the paragraph of the quoted case law as meaning that if the method of taxation 
for intra-group transfers does not comply with the ALP and leads to a taxable 
base inferior to the one which would result from a correct implementation of 
that principle, it provides a selective advantage to the company concerned.337 
The paragraph quoted is the following, 
In order to decide whether a method of assessment of taxable income 
such as that laid down under the regime for coordination centres confers 
an advantage on them, it is necessary, as the Commission suggests at 
point 95 of the contested decision, to compare that regime with the 
ordinary tax system, based on the difference between profits and 
outgoings of an undertaking carrying on its activities in conditions of free 
competition. 
Even though we feel that in the light of the previous transfer pricing decisional 
practice the ALP may be used as a benchmark only when it forms part of the 
domestic tax system of Member State thus forming part of the reference system 
for the purposes of step 1 of the selectivity analysis, we find it very hard to agree 
with the EC's aforementioned interpretation of the case law. In our view the 
paragraph quoted by the EC does not necessarily state that any deviation from 
the ALP leads to a selective advantage but simply provides a comparability test, 
that is, that the scheme is compared with the ordinary tax system. 
As pointed by Gunn and Lutz,338 the EC does not appear to follow this three step
approach, however, we argue that firstly, as we have seen above in Gibraltar, the 
EC need not follow this three step approach and need not expressly and 
specifically outline the reference system even though we feel that the 
identification of the ordinary tax system is a very important step. However, the 
EC mentions in paragraph 54 of its preliminary decision that the method of 
assessment of the taxable income needs to be compared to the ordinary tax 
336 Case C-45/2001 French Headquarters and Logistics Centres [2004] OJ L23 recitals 50 and 53; 
Case C-47 /2001 Germany - foreign companies coordination centres (2001] OJ Ll 77 /17 
recitals 46-47 and 50; Case C-48/2001 Spain - Vizcaya coordination centres (2003] OJ 
L31/26; Case C-49/2001 Luxembourg - coordination centres (2003] OJ L170/20; Case C-
50/2001 Luxembourg - Finance Companies (2002]; Case C-15/2002 Belgium - Coordination 
Centres (2003] OJ L282/25 recitals 89-95; Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217 /03 Belgium 
and Forum 187 vs. Commission (2006) ECR 1-5479, paras 96-97. 
337 Case C-45/2001 French Headquarters and Logistics Centres (2004] OJ L 23 recitals 50. 
338 Anna Gunn, Joris Luts, 'Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issue' (2015) 24 EC Tax 
Review 119, 119-125. 
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system based on the difference between profits and losses of an undertaking 
carrying on its activities under normal market conditions. Furthermore, the EC 
goes on to say that market conditions may be arrived at through transfer pricing 
established at arm's length. Therefore, we infer that the EC is using the ALP as 
the benchmark or reference 'normal' tax system, which is the first step to take of 
the three step approach. In the Amazon decision it is explained that Article 164 of 
the Luxembourg Tax Code, which constitutes the legislative basis for transfer 
pricing in Luxembourg, implements the arm's length principle laid down in 
Article 9 of the OECD MC.339 Hence the ALP is part of the national tax system,
which is the relevant reference framework in examining the selectivity of 
national fiscal measures under the State aid rules. 
We have seen how far the purposes of selectivity, the courts have established a 
three step approach. As one of the steps one must identify the normal regime 
applicable in the Member State concerned. This means that the normal regime 
must be part of a State's domestic law. The EC clarified in its final decision 
concerning the Netherlands that the reference system consists of the general 
Dutch corporate income tax system which has the taxation of the profits of all 
firms that are subject to tax in the Netherlands as a goal. Whilst the ALP is 
embedded in the domestic law of Luxembourg,340 and the Netherlands,341 it is 
not the same for Ireland (up to 2010). Therefore, one may question the EC's 
reasoning and reliance on the ALP vis-a-vis Ireland when technically it did not 
form part of the Irish 'normal' tax regime. It may be problematic for the EC to 
ascertain whether the ALP forms part of the reference system of a Member State 
where no transfer pricing rules exist. 
To this effect, it is logical to assume at this stage, that if a principle does not form 
part of the normal tax system in question, consequently there can be no 
derogation from it. We have seen how the ALP has achieved an internationally 
recognised status but can it be considered as forming part of the normal tax 
system of a Member State within the EU without actual transposition of the ALP 
in its domestic law? The answer to this question may be achieved if we assume 
that there is an international tax regime with principles ( such as the ALP), which 
are inherent in every national tax system. However, there is hardly any 
agreement that such international tax regime exists and even more so that such 
principles are inherent in every national tax system. According to Reuven Avi­
Jonah,342 he argues repeatedly that a coherent international tax regime exists, 
339 Alleged aid to Amazon by way of a tax ruling SA.38944 C(2014) 7156 (2014] recital 59. 
340 ibid. 
341 Alleged aid to Starbucks SA.38374 C(2014) 3626 final (2014] recital 31. 
342 Reuven S. Avi-Jonah, International Tax as International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007) Chapter 1. 
79 
ELSA MALTA LAW REVIEW 
embodied both in the tax treaty network and in domestic laws, and that it forms 
a significant part of international law (both treaty-based,343 and customary
international law). This thesis is quite controversial. Several international tax 
academics and practitioners in the United States have advocated the view that 
there is no international tax regime and that countries are free to adopt any tax 
rules they believe will further their own interests.344 Other tax academics and
practitioners have supported the view advocated above.345
6. Conclusions
Firstly, a State may not rely solely on Article 9 of a tax treaty concluded with 
another State to enforce the ALP but it needs to implement the ALP in its 
domestic law. That being established, for the purposes of the State aid rules as 
laid down under Article 107 of the TFEU, if the ALP is not transposed within a 
State's domestic tax system, it cannot be considered that the ALP forms part of 
the reference system of 'normal' tax system of the State. Moreover, we also 
conclude that whilst it is acknowledged that the ALP is the internationally 
recognised standard for determining the correct transfer price between related 
parties, it does not have the status of customary international law which would 
make the ALP directly applicable without the need for traditional means of 
transposition within the national legal systems. The EC clarify in its Final Notice 
that the ALP necessarily forms part of the EC's assessment of tax measures 
granted to group companies under Article 107(1) of the Treaty, independently of 
whether a Member State has incorporated this principle into its national legal 
343 By way of reminder, we have seen in chapter 1 of this article that a tax treaty does not give 
tax rights in itself, and according to Vogel, a State may not rely on Article 9 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention alone without implementing such within its domestic law. 
344 Graetz, Michael J., 'Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, 
and Unsatisfactory Policies'(2001) 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1357; David H. 
Rosenbloom, 'Cross-Border Arbitrage: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly' (2007) Taxes - The 
Tax Magazine; David H. Rosenbloom, 'International Tax Arbitrage and the 'International Tax 
System' (2000), 53 Tax Law Review 137; Julie Roin, 'Competition and Evasion: Another 
Perspective on International Tax Competition' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law journal 543; 
Tsilly Dagan, 'The Tax Treaties Myth' (2000), 32 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Policy 939; Mitchell A. Kane, 'Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to 
International Tax Arbitrage' (2005), 53 Emory Law Journal 89. 
345 Luca dell'Anese, 'Tax Arbitrage and the Changing Structure of International Tax Law' 
(2006); Diane M. Ring, 'One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax 
Arbitrage (2005) 44 Boston College Law Review 79; Shay N. Menuchin, 'The Dilemma of 
International Tax Arbitrage: A Comparative Analysis using the cases of Hybrid Financial 
Instruments and Cross-border leasing' (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and 
Political Science 2005); Hugh J. Ault, 'The Importance of International Cooperation in 
Forging Tax Policy' (2001), 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1693; Paul R. 
McDaniel, 'Trade and Taxation' (2001), 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1621; 
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system and in what form. It is used to establish whether the taxable profit of a 
group company for corporate income tax purposes has been determined on the 
basis of a methodology that produces a reliable approximation of a market-based 
outcome.346 
With respect to the EC's transfer pncmg decisional practice, the EC's 2004 
Report clarified that to determine whether a tax scheme derogating from the 
normal system may constitute State aid, it must be established whether the 
resulting tax burden is lower than that which would have resulted from the 
application of the relevant Members States' normal taxation method. We 
therefore infer that in derogating from the normal tax method one must compare 
the tax burden of undertakings calculated by the normal tax method and the tax 
burden of undertakings calculated by the alternative method e.g. a fixed margin. 
(n this respect, the non-adherence to the ALP between related parties will result 
in a lower tax burden when compared to undertakings which adhere to the ALP 
i.e. independent parties.
Furthermore, we conclude that for the purposes of selectivity test as one of the 
conditions of the State aid rules, the comparables for the purposes of the 
comparison test, are various. The EC needs to clarify against which undertakings 
must the comparability test be applied. Indeed, this is the purpose for selecting a 
reference framework in order to determine those undertakings, which are in a 
similar legal and factual position. Moreover, as demonstrated by the EC's 
decisional practice if a ruling allows taxpayers to use alternative methods to 
calculate taxable profits, inter alia, fixed margins for a cost plus method for 
determining an appropriate transfer price, that ruling may involve State aid. We 
further conclude that, tax rulings are selective in particular where, the tax 
authorities have discretion in granting administrative rulings, the rulings are not 
available to undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation, the 
administration appears to apply a more favourable discretionary tax treatment 
compared with other taxpayers in a similar factual and legal situation and the 
ruling has been issued in contradiction to the applicable tax provisions and 
resulted in a lower amount of tax. 
Finally, the normal tax system requires related party transactions to be in 
accordance with the ALP and such transactions can only be examined against the 
ALP and not any other standard. The ALP already permits that special conditions 
adopted between related parties are replaced by market conditions which reflect 
the economic reality between independent parties. Thus, the introduction of the 
346 Case C-241/94 French Republic vs. Commission of the European Communities [1996) ECR 1-
4551 para 172. 
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PIMO may be unnecessary and the ALP is sufficient to establish normal market 
conditions. 
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